In doing so, they have achieved previously unimaginable things. They took back enormous parts of Russian-occupied territory, pushed the Black Sea Fleet out of combat without having a navy, destroyed around 20 percent of Russia’s tactical bomber fleet, invaded mainland Russian territory, inflicted severe harm on industrial facilities deep inside Russia, and degraded the Russian military to the point where it is starting to use cavalry.

They have done so because they know what is at stake. Unlike many fools in the West, they understand Putin and his war goals. They know that his ultimate goal is to make Ukraine a vassal state of the Russian Federation, restoring centuries of subjugation that they have only recently escaped, in a quest to recreate an imagined, glorious imperial past.

Ukrainians are also fully aware of how they would be treated under Russian de facto occupation. A Russian victory would mean that “Ukrainian” as an identity would be considered criminal and worthy of punishment. It would mean that those who do not bow would be incarcerated or outright executed en masse.

These lessons are obvious from the territories that Russia has held control over. The scale of atrocities in Bucha and Mariupol are just the most obvious examples of a structural pattern that is being promoted by Russian leadership.

For me, and for many others, it is clear that there are three minimalist demands that Ukraine needs to make to preserve its sovereign existence:

• Ironclad security guarantees from the West that would guarantee a direct military intervention if Russia invades again.

• No legal recognition of areas that the Russian Federation has currently annexed.

• A sovereign country free of Russian interference.

If these three points were fulfilled, it would constitute nothing close to a just outcome of the war. The situation for Ukraine and the West would still be horrible, and I do not even want to start predicting the adverse effects it would have down the line. But it would be a tolerable starting point.

Russia, of course, is miles away from even considering these three demands. They are directly opposed to its imperial aspirations. For now, Russia also lacks the incentives to agree to such a deal. After all, if it continues fighting, it might yet achieve its goals through a combination of Donald Trump’s disastrous foreign policy and Western countries falling to their illiberal allies.

There is no way in which we, the citizens of the West (and of European countries in particular), can let this happen. Not only would a Russian victory represent an unimaginable moral failing, it would also put other European countries in direct danger of renewed Russian aggression. Those who doubt this are simply closing their eyes to the clear evidence of Russia already waging a hybrid war against European countries.

So what developments do we have to keep in mind?

• Ukrainians are currently stable on the battlefield. Just recently, there have been reports of them taking back Russian-occupied territory. This does not mean that the situation is good, but it does mean that it is not catastrophic. Civilians are in a dire situation, as permanent Russian attacks have rendered heating impossible for a large number of people during a brutally cold winter.

• We cannot rely on the US to do anything constructive. It has practically canceled all aid, and its diplomatic efforts range from decent but meaningless to absolutely catastrophic. Our only hope is that it does not attempt to re-involve itself more heavily in a destructive direction.

• European governments are now broadly moving in the right direction (excluding Hungary, Slovakia, and sometimes the Czech Republic). The basic realization that the war in Ukraine is existential and that American allies will not help has finally sunk in among government officials. There are still important disputes at the level of specific policy (Belgium not confiscating frozen Russian assets, etc.), but I am confident that a tolerable outcome is achievable on the current course.

• European societies have largely lost interest in the war in Ukraine. While significant sections remain adequately invested, most of Europe does not understand that this conflict is existential. Ukraine is not a major topic in public discourse, and it certainly is not a topic that can strongly sway elections. The most anti-Ukrainian parties and figures do not genuinely care about the war; they are simply using it to virtue-signal about “peace” and as another weapon against establishment parties.

Thus, we must remain adamant in our support for Ukraine and pressure European leaders not to back down, while simultaneously pushing against the destructive forces that would undermine that support in other areas of public discourse.

For the past few years, the political landscape in Europe has been shifting. Previously fringe parties that explicitly reject the old boundaries of European discourse are on the rise, rapidly gaining votes and winning elections. This movement cannot defined by the categories of discourse that dominated until then, as they include parties associated with the left and right-wing.

While it is of course true that the politics of each individual European countries are distinct and deserve their nuance, I believe it is valuable to look beyond country borders to determine what unites the greatest political upheaval in Europe since the fall of the Berlin Wall.

For that purpose, I analyzed the rhetoric of several prominent politicians that embody the current shift. Concretely, I listened to 6 CPAC speeches that cover a diverse set of personalities, each with different characteristics. In this set of speeches, I have western and eastern Europeans, prime ministers and opposition leaders, self described social democrats and self described libertarians.

With this information, I intend to identify the defining traits of this shift, analyze why it is so successful, and point to frictions that could possibly undermine it. In the second part, I’ll outline my challenges to its core claims.

Speaker profiles

• Eva Vlaardingerbroek:

  • Dutch far right political commentator.

  • Known for spreading the Great Reset and Great Replacement Theory

  • Well connected to other political commentators and major politicians, particularly with the MAGA movement

  • Link to the speech

• Robert Fico:

  • Slovak Prime Minister.

  • Leader of the Social Democratic party of Slovakia

  • Decidedly on the “conservative” side of the culture war.

  • Orbán’s closest ally in the EU.

  • Link

• Alice Weidel:

  • Leader of the strongest opposition party in Germany, which formed out of opposition to EU policies, but has gradually become more focused on the Migration issue.

  • Explicitly Supported by Elon Musk for some libertarian policies.

  • Link

• Herbert Kickl:

  • Leader of the strongest Austrian party.

  • Currently in the opposition

  • Ideologically centered on nationalism and heavily focused on Migration

  • Link

• Geert Wilders:

  • At the time of his speech, he was a prominent leader of the Dutch government

  • Focused on his opposition to Islam as a “defense of the West”

  • Link

• Andrej Babiš:

  • Current Czech Prime Minister

  • Multi-billionaire

  • Combines right wing positions on cultural issues with some leftist economic policy

  • Link

Core tenets of European Illiberalism

Throughout the speeches I listened to, there was a surprisingly large amount of overlap between the speakers, given their differences. I have extracted 5 points of almost complete convergence (they will be dissected with more detail in the part 2) :

• A rejection of the “elites” and their policies, often associated with globalism.

• A conception of democracy as the raw will of the majority, without regard for the institutions and balances that make it work.

• Criticism of the EU’s institutions as centralist and paternalistic, and it’s policies such as the Green Deal, DSA and Migration pact.

• A quasi-mythological conception of the sovereign state and it’s sovereign inhabitants as a virtue, often in combination with a notion of “Judeo-Christian values”

• An emphasis on Migration as a civilization-defining threat facing Europe

There are of course, other points on which illiberals agree on, but they are downstream of the beliefs I listed above. They serve as a foundation on which these parties built their entire epistemological frameworks and the core of their morality.

Note: There are some speakers and parties that don’t fit all of these criteria. Geert Wilders and Robert Fico for example, don’t seem to have the same discontent for institutions as some of their counterparts. Weidel doesn’t play into the Judeo-Christian values, and instead centers herself on the virtue of “freedom”. These are expected variations inside this movement, given that it spans a whole continent of different political traditions and modes.

Why does it work?

Something about this combination of beliefs seems to be resonating with a significant chunk of the voter base.

The core base of all these beliefs is that there is something fundamentally wrong with the current system, which is an extremely appealing idea. Everyone faces their own struggles, and it’s really convenient to assign blame to those struggles on an external force.

Illiberals basically construct a worldview in which they let people attach their own grievances and enemies onto such an external force, while themselves retaining the authority to define that force to their own ends.

As a concrete example, imagine a factory worker pissed off about his salary being too small. He also lives in a neighborhood with a large migrant population and the streets are often littered with trash. Through social media, he discovers people complaining about similar things and starts listening to pundits affiliated with an illiberal party. What they do now, is assign both his economic misfortune and the rubbish on the streets to the immigrants that live there. From there on, they can just point to a vague notion of “elites” or “establishment politics” that are at fault for this immigration, and declare that they are proudly fighting against it, and that they need his support to do so effectively.

At this point, the factory worker is predisposed to accept any rationale that comes from the illiberal party, as long as it is aimed against his perceived wrongdoers.

You can imagine them doing this with every possible annoyance coupled with some cultural issue that they have staked a position on. Through this system, they have a massive potential to attract people that usually have very little to do with politics, or those that have grown disillusioned with them.

It is also very hard to get people out of this, because cognitively, their positions are coupled with very prominent problems of their lives, and if you dispute them, you dispute their lived experience. Switching minds is practically impossible from this vantage point.

Points of friction

So one could argue that the illiberal shift is inevitable, and any struggle against it is futile. But that misses out on some crucial perspectives that are very threatening to it.

Internal Conflict

The first danger is the conflicting ideas inside the movement. Because their foundational ideas are so abstracted and vague and there is no shared method of getting to Truth, instinct and preconceptions can lead to significant disagreement inside the group.

For instance, there is a huge unresolved conflict about the arguably most important part of a political vision, namely economics. Some prominent figures argue for radical slashes to regulation, unrestrained free markets and such (the most prominent example of this being Alice Weidel). Others advocate for stronger social safety nets, protectionism and higher taxes on corporations (Robert Fico and Andrej Babiš come to mind). This can result in a politician calling a measure “radically communist”, only for it to be endorsed by a figure that goes on the same stage on the next day.

While there is a broad agreement that the EU in its current form is bad, it is also hotly discussed how it should be reformed. Some say that it should be changed to a pure space of free movement and markets, but others have a more holistic vision of “community of sovereign nations” also aligned on fundamental values. Such conflicts, if left unresolved might significantly splinter the movement and lead to the loss of political power and votes.

Governance

The same vagueness and universality of the messaging which seems unstoppable in messaging can become a huge problem when you actually have to govern a country. Because, while it is more appealing to do these sweeping changes and an overhaul of the whole system, it is a recipe for failure when dealing with actual problems, which are most often extremely multi-faceted, with multiple competing nuanced ways of solving them.

To be clear, I’m not saying that it is impossible for illiberals to govern, or that they can’t produce good outcomes, just that they are predisposed to cause great harm

As much as people act flabbergasted about most establishment parties acting in a very deliberate, regulated way when dealing with an issue, and often settling on weird compromises, there is a good reason for that pattern. Every “common sense” solution might have a myriad of unintended consequences down the line. By helping one interest group, you are very likely to harm other interest groups. Through these long negotiations and decision-making, the potential for future chaos can be minimized, if not outright averted.

By not showing an understanding of this delicate process and disregarding several checks on decision-making, illiberals are setting themselves up for disaster. And even though they are talented at political messaging, you can only hold an electorate for so long. One of the role models of the current illiberal movement, Donald Trump, showed this beautifully in his first term (mainly in his response to the COVID Pandemic), so well in fact, that he got voted out of office. It seems that after 14 years in power, Hungary’s Orbán is facing the same reality check, with recent polls suggesting that he is behind the opposition by ten percent.

Liberal Adaptation

While parties more in keeping with the Liberal Democratic framework have been struggling against the new wave of illiberal surges, it is very possible that they learn to fight them better through that experience.

Particularly when paired with illiberals holding power, this can yield some very promising results, like in the Netherlands, where the D66 party narrowly defeated Geert Wilders’s previously dominant party.

Conclusion

European Illiberalism is a sharp reaction to the post Cold war order. It is built upon rejecting the direction that the world has been going since then, and channels various grievances associated with that into political power.

That grants it a strong appeal, but is sorely lacking as a foundation for doing politics. While there are currently numerous attempts to build something atop of it, the foundation will have to be heavily modified to sustain itself into the future.

Without that, I don’t see how this force can be a constructive vector for change in Europe. Instead, it will hamper political development, degrade important institutions and implement catastrophic policies.

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Instead of continually indulging in this effort in 2026, I have decided to tackle the problem from a different perspective. I no longer want to engage with the arguments of the opposing side, but to analyze the social forces which make their rhetoric thrive. It is of course possible to analyze different discourses through this lens as well.

Step 1: Analysis

So, what are these forces:

• Conspiratorial opposition to the status quo: Around the COVID-19 pandemic, a considerable proportion of the West’s population lost all belief in the main pillars struggling to keep our society together. “The Establishment,” whatever that means, is seen as an almost omnipotent force causing all the harms around the world. These segments of the population instinctively reject anything coming from establishment media, academia, or regular politicians.

• Internal critique: After the collapse of the Soviet Union, most people thought that nothing could stop the liberal world order from advancing, and that all hostile, powerful forces had been defeated. This caused a massive re-orientation toward internal critique: a constant stream of criticism of the status quo and the West in general. Iraq, the climate crisis, corruption—all of them provided plenty of justification to feel bad about the state of affairs. In the process, we have lost perspective on just how much better we have it than our ancestors, or people living under oppressive regimes in China, Russia, or Iran. Because of this, large sections of the left and right have trouble justifying a defense of that order against an impending threat.

• The Internet: New technologies have destroyed all institutional checks on who gets to broadcast to a huge audience. Everyone, no matter how ill-informed, can just scream his opinion into the receptive minds of potentially millions of people. This has lifted conspiratorial thinking out of local pubs and obscure newspapers right into the cabinet of the US president.

• Foreign interference: While this is often overstated, forces like Russia and China have heavily invested in influencing Western public opinion. They mostly serve as amplifiers of already existing sentiment (as in the Tenet Media case), but one must remain aware of the danger of this amplifier flipping close elections or slowly undermining areas of public agreement.

Step 2: Corrective measures

While it is good to know about these factors, it is not enough. What is more important is addressing them correctly. Below, I’ve outlined my suggestions, for what practical steps can be implemented by almost everyone:

• Conspiratorial opposition to the status quo: There are two main areas of action, namely containment and conversion. In the area of containment, one must go out of one’s way to promote healthy epistemic practices and call out conspiracy theories. Debunking sites are vital tools in this effort, but most of the work must be done by people themselves. The simple idea that “the world is incredibly complicated, so I should read up on a specific topic before committing to an opinion” must be ingrained in the minds of many. Conversion is far more difficult and can only be done in a very limited manner. I’d encourage reading my general text on persuasion, but in short: only engage those who are open to it, don’t back them into a corner, and offer a convincing alternative.

• Internal critique: Our societies need to re-learn perspective, and to recognize that there are gradients of unpleasant experience. There needs to be a broader appreciation of the good parts of our civilization, while still being able to see its flaws. Cultural commentary must improve its ability to present issues in more gray tones and avoid overstating flaws.

• The Internet: This is by far the hardest issue to address, because it requires both striving toward an ideal state and pragmatically navigating the current one. In my estimation, the old age of media was simply superior. I believe that, on balance, the editorial boards of major news organizations can inform you far better than a lone writer on social media. To be perfectly clear, this includes me. I try to hold myself to high standards, but I don’t pretend to be as qualified for this task as a seasoned journalist. My rationale for posting on Substack is that it is good to provide people with good information on any platform, if only to counteract more destructive forces. Which brings me to my conclusion: try to inform yourself through reliable media, and if you can, try to bring this information over to more unserious platforms.

• Foreign interference: There is not much that can be done about this except keeping an eye on your sources of information and spreading awareness of such cases.

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My position

I’ll start off by laying out my position, which is necessary context to understand the contentions:

I believe that the West should support Ukraine, militarily, economically, and diplomatically. There are multiple reasons for this, chief among them, that this is in the West’s security interest. Allowing Russia to simply get away with expanding through an aggressive war and breaking international rule, creates a horrible precedent and endangers the world order. If dictators around see that Putin got what he wanted by invading another country, they might follow suit, causing a slew of conflict that would destabilize the whole world. The only method to prevent such an outcome is to assist Ukraine in such a way that Russia doesn’t get all that it wants and is deterred from invading in the future. Such an outcome is only achievable through militarily aiding Ukraine in its defense of its territory.

Another reason for supporting Ukraine is that it is simply the moral thing to do. Ukraine is fighting to keep out an invader which has demonstrated that his sole objective is the erasure of the Ukrainian nation itself. This is supported by both public statements and the horrendous Russian war conduct. Without our support, the level of human suffering that will be inflicted on the Ukrainian people will be incalculable.

One thing that is also often overlooked is just how the Ukrainians have given up the third biggest nuclear stockpile in exchange for recognition of its sovereignty, which was partly guaranteed by western countries like the US, UK and France. If they lose it, that would send a terrible signal to the entire world, destroying the west’s reputation and disincentivizing nuclear-non-proliferation.

If you want to see my dedicated post to this stance, click here.

Contentious points

1

The first hard question to answer is about how an ideal but practical solution to the conflict would look like. Of course, the full liberation of Ukrainian territory is an aspirational goal, but that would necessitate a full-blown collapse and retreat of the Russian. In my estimation, this could come across as so regime-threatening to Putin that he could panic and go for the nuclear option. However, nuclear blackmail must not deter us from doing what is right, as this logic can be repeated infinitely to the point of just submitting to a nuclear bully all the time. Both of these considerations have to be kept in mind and balanced when deciding the course of action.

Ideally, we should be aiming at a situation where the Ukrainians can degrade Russian forces to such a degree that the leadership’s rationale changes from seeing this war as a necessary burden, to a burden so heavy that it has to be alleviated. In that moment, a solution has to be proposed that guarantees Ukraine’s security while allowing Russian leadership to proclaim victory, which would stave off the fear of the regime collapsing. The final deal would probably entail (de-facto, not de-jure) territorial concessions and a rehabilitation of Russia on the world stage in exchange for Ukrainian membership in an alliance committed to defending its sovereignty by any means necessary.

2

That solution opens up the question of how to concretely achieve that goal. Does this mean that we should just keep supplying Ukraine with weapons, or that we should close the skies, or even send soldiers?

The answer to that question is multi-layered.

• As a baseline, we have to sustain the military effort of the Ukrainian armed forces, which means sustained, reliable, arms shipments. Next, Russia actually has to suffer attacks on its own territory, which the Ukrainians have down a fantastic job of, but our military capabilities could help tremendously with that (ATACMS and such) .

• Another thing worth considering (but not the main thing) is partially closing the skies above parts of Ukraine and shooting down drones and missiles above western Ukraine, from NATO territory. This should not present any legal problems and might help with creating safe zones, which are crucial for supply lines.

• I am personally not a fan of troop deployment outside of a ceasefire, because the potential for escalation is simply too great, with little benefit to make up for it.

To reiterate, these proposals for more direct involvement might sound great and situation-changing, but our main focus must be on delivering the baseline. The Western “Military Industrial Complex” can easily out-manufacture the Russian war machine, which is the main component of reaching our desired end-state. If Russia cannot make gains on the battlefield, that creates an environment in which they eventually can’t win the war.

Conclusion

The West’s ambition in regard to Ukraine must be a peace that guarantees Ukrainian security while giving Russian leadership the option to exit and save face. To that end, we must keep up military and economic aid to keep the front stable and give the Ukrainians the means to incur severe harm on Russian territory.

Of course, the main threat to this plan of action are the growing, (functionally) pro-Russian movements which would prefer us to simply exit this war and suffer the consequences later on. We must do everything in our power to prevent them from getting their way and ending an era of certain European peace and stability.

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Thus, I have decided to rip into it, and check if I have to rewrite it.

Stylistic failures

For my eyes, it’s painfully obvious that I wrote this at a time where I only just got into writing and was extremely uncomfortable with my writing style. In a misguided attempt to compensate for this, I turned to Chatgpt and told him to make it better (noticeable by the amount of emdashes) . The result is that:

• The text swings quite heavily in style between the parts I wrote myself and the ones edited by the chatbot.

• The chatbot parts of the text are incredibly overstuffed with rhetorical filler and evasive language, even when it’s not necessary at all. This is weird given that I criticized exactly this style of writing one week after releasing this.

• It’s a pretty awkward mix between poetic prose delivering deep thoughts, analytical rigidity trying to spot problems, weird personal interjections, and pretty rude polemic.

The Chapters also don’t neatly fit into one another because I tried to cover a lot of ground, but that is something that can be fixed.

Intellectual laziness

Partly because of me being unable to communicate effectively back then, some causal chains were seriously lacking. For example, my allusion to conservatism and progressivism as a way of dealing with broken systems is just not correct. What I meant to say was that those two are the most basic problem-solving methods humanity has developed.

Also, my section critiquing conservatism also doesn’t quite make sense. They’re covering for racism, bigotry and such by twisting their own principles, therefore they don’t address real issues and because of that, they get overtaken by illiberal forces. If you made sense of that, congratulations, because I couldn’t! This is because I try to fit a multitude of problems under the same umbrella.

• Conservatives defense of order and stability often defends unjust institutions that further bigotry and racism.

• Conservatives often fail to dynamically adapt to pressing problems, creating the breeding ground for reactionary backlash.

• Conservatives often fail to recognize the danger that comes from reactionaries with no regard to liberal democracy that supposedly share their values, and open the doors for them to enter mainstream politics

One could argue that my critique of fascism is too short and doesn’t address it properly, but I still think the ideology is so laughable that it doesn’t deserve such thorough analysis.

The “My Beliefs” section is way too vague, allows for a lot of interpretations, and isn’t grounded by anything than instinct. I have already corrected this wrong by specifically advocating for policies.

Including a list of influences in the appendices was an interesting idea, but also intellectually lazy since I relied on others to improve a case I was trying to make, often without even closely examining their takes.

Things I changed my mind on

Part of what has resulted in this carelessness in the appendix is that I included people who are, upon closer inspection, not people I should endorse at all. Douglas Murray does have some valid points on conservatism but falls short of what I advertise him as. Jordan Peterson may be a genius, but not in his political work, that’s for certain. Adam Something may have good ideas on public infrastructure and some foreign policy, but he doesn’t have more analytical bandwidth than a twitter-leftist when assessing sociological phenomena. Slavoj Žižek which I mostly recommended because I wanted an intelligent radical leftist is profoundly unserious as a public intellectual.

Disclaimer: These are exaggerated critiques of the persons I elevated to such a high pedestal in the manifesto. It is not my definitive take on them, just an acknowledgement of their flaws, as I see them.

I also included a second appendix in which I tried to respond to questions I had no response to. Both of the questions I asked are answered infinitely better in a recent essay I posted, as well as this older one.

Conclusion

I cannot let this post stand as it is, so I’ll take it down from my Substack shortly. I have uploaded it on my website with the additional context, so if you want to go read it, check it out there, while I work on a text I can actually be proud of.

If you want to see that next, please consider to

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The situation that crystallized after the unprecedented result of the last election is worth a thorough analysis — and that’s exactly what I’m here to give you.

This piece provides an overview of the current Austrian political landscape in the aftermath of the election. It outlines the present parliamentary configuration and explains the main parties and their positions. The second half focuses on the party leaders, based on their appearances in the Sommergespräche — annual one-hour interviews that offer the clearest look at each party’s priorities. A complementary German version on my website expands on the interviews in greater detail. There’s also a complementary post in German on my website where I give more opinionated takes on the interviews in full.

Disclaimer: The Sommergespräche happened around September, a lot has obviously changed since then.

Government

Austria is currently governed by a three-party coalition between the ÖVP, SPÖ, and NEOS — an alliance formed after months of difficult negotiations. The ÖVP leads as the largest party, followed by the SPÖ, with NEOS serving as the smallest partner.

ÖVP

Situation

The ÖVP governed with the Greens in the previous term and entered the election as the largest party. However, it lost that position to the FPÖ, which won the most votes. Despite this setback, the ÖVP managed to form a ruling coalition after a drawn-out negotiation process marked by two failed attempts and a change in leadership. The party currently holds the chancellorship and several key cabinet positions.

Political Profile and policies

The ÖVP is a moderately conservative party that has shaped Austria’s politics since its founding, having been part of nearly every postwar government. Its new leader, Christian Stocker, serves as chancellor and the country’s primary representative. In his Sommergespräch, Stocker emphasized a pragmatic commitment to preserving Austria’s liberal democratic system while modernizing institutions in cooperation with willing partners. He described the FPÖ as unwilling to engage constructively on policies that would benefit its own voters.

Economically, the ÖVP’s program focuses on curbing inflation to around two percent and stimulating growth through a targeted one-billion-euro investment package, offset by subsidy cuts. The party plans to address Austria’s so-called “Österreichaufschlag”—the price premium companies often charge in the Austrian market—both nationally and within the EU. Rents are to rise by no more than one percent, with further reforms linking rent adjustments slightly below the inflation rate and introducing a “sustainability mechanism” to balance entry age and income in the rental system. The ÖVP also aims to lower energy prices by partially restructuring state-run energy companies and opening the grid to private investment.

On asylum and migration, the party stresses preparedness for future crises, investment in origin countries, and closer coordination with Balkan transit states. Stocker advocates expanding the list of “safe origin countries,” creating legal conditions for deportations to Syria and Afghanistan, and reducing state payments to asylum seekers until they contribute to the social system.

In foreign policy, the ÖVP calls for diversifying trade due to the risks of overreliance on the U.S. market. The government seeks to renegotiate the MERCOSUR agreement, develop a European framework to prevent capital flight to the U.S., and increase EU-based production capacity. Stocker stressed that Austria must balance values and interests pragmatically and reaffirmed that NATO membership remains off the table.

SPÖ

Situation

The SPÖ spent the previous term in opposition and entered the election aiming to regain first place. It ultimately finished third but succeeded in joining the new governing coalition with the ÖVP and NEOS after complex negotiations. The party now holds the vice chancellorship and the finance ministry.

Political Profile and Policies

The SPÖ is a traditionally left-wing party that has played a central role in shaping Austria’s modern political landscape. Its leader, Andreas Babler, serves as vice chancellor and minister of culture. In his Sommergespräch, Babler framed his platform around repairing what he called the failures of the previous government, arguing that rising inflation and inequality have driven many working-class voters toward right-wing populism. He emphasized that reducing national debt must go hand in hand with continued investment in the country’s development.

Economically, the SPÖ calls for strong state intervention to curb inflation. Its policies include rent control, energy price caps, and measures to pressure companies into lowering food prices. The party supports tackling the “Österreichaufschlag” at both national and EU levels and advocates renegotiating the MERCOSUR trade deal to protect Austrian farmers.

On climate policy, the SPÖ proposes codifying the goal of climate neutrality by 2040 into law and introducing a mandatory “climate check” for all new legislation. It also calls for ending subsidies that harm the environment.

Culturally, the party aims to secure funding for smaller artistic and community projects while potentially scaling back subsidies for large, already well-financed institutions. Babler also expressed a long-term goal of reducing taxes on books to strengthen cultural accessibility.

In foreign policy, the SPÖ takes a critical stance toward Israel’s government, condemning human rights violations and calling for an immediate ceasefire in Gaza as a precondition for negotiations. Babler reaffirmed support for a two-state solution based on the framework of the Oslo Accords.

On asylum and integration, the SPÖ supports reducing the number of asylum seekers dependent on the social safety net while facilitating labor market access for adults and ensuring the welfare of all children, including those from migrant families. The party favors a temporary suspension of family reunification and plans to expand integration programs, particularly through German-language instruction.

NEOS

Situation

NEOS had never previously participated in government but entered the election determined to change that. The party won enough seats to play a decisive role in coalition negotiations and ultimately joined the governing alliance with the ÖVP and SPÖ. It currently holds the foreign and education ministries.

Political Profile and Policies

NEOS is a liberal party that originally split from the ÖVP to promote a platform centered on economic freedom, European integration, and individual liberties. Its leader, who now serves as foreign minister, outlined her positions in her Sommergespräch, presenting NEOS as the driving force behind reform within the current coalition. She emphasized that the legislature must function according to the electoral mandate, even if that requires compromise.

In foreign policy, NEOS takes a distinctly pro-European and internationalist stance. The party views Ukrainian security interests as inseparable from Europe’s own and insists that only Europe can reliably guarantee their fulfillment. It rejects rewarding aggression through territorial concessions and supports a ceasefire as a stepping stone toward a negotiated settlement — one that must include Ukraine as a full party to the talks. The leader argued that Putin must be brought to the negotiating table through military pressure, not goodwill, and that Austria should contribute to a peacekeeping force under a UN mandate.

NEOS advocates relying on the OSCE as a long-term European security framework and calls for higher EU military spending to ensure credible deterrence. It supports deeper European defense cooperation while maintaining that neutral countries must retain robust self-defense capabilities. The party also stresses the need for diversified trade relations, favoring the conclusion of the MERCOSUR agreements to avoid overdependence on either the U.S. or Russia. Free trade is seen as the optimal economic model, while tariffs are described as harmful to all parties.

In its broader geopolitical outlook, NEOS positions itself as both pro-Western and critical of complacency within the liberal order. It supports close cooperation with the U.S. but warns against American unreliability, arguing that Europe must develop the capacity to project strength independently. On Israel, the party affirms solidarity with the state while openly criticizing the government’s human rights record, reaffirming support for a two-state solution guaranteeing security for both peoples.

Economically, NEOS’s agenda prioritizes structural reform over expanded public spending. The party calls for increasing productivity, reducing subsidies, and simplifying the division of administrative responsibilities between national, regional, and municipal levels. Having already consolidated the budget, NEOS seeks to secure sustainable growth through future-oriented investments. Rent reform and an increase in the retirement age are presented as necessary adjustments to maintain long-term fiscal balance.

Inflation, in their view, must be countered through a combination of limited state intervention and greater market competition. NEOS plans to make switching energy suppliers easier to lower prices and speed up the development of renewable energy infrastructure, arguing that domestic renewables protect Austria from external pressure. The party identifies three main priorities for reform: education, energy infrastructure, and healthcare — all viewed as critical to maintaining competitiveness and social stability.

Opposition

Green Party

Situation

After serving as the junior partner in a coalition with the ÖVP, the Greens suffered heavy losses in the election and moved into opposition.

Political Profile and policies

The Greens are a left-wing party whose central focus remains the fight against climate change. In her Sommergespräch, the party’s leader argued that the ÖVP chose not to renew their coalition because its program could not advance as easily with the Greens as with the SPÖ or NEOS. She emphasized the need for clearer communication with the public and stronger messaging on core issues like climate action, highlighting the Klimaticket—a nationwide public transport pass introduced during their time in government—as evidence that the party can deliver tangible results.

Economically, the Greens frame many of Austria’s structural problems as legacies of past governments’ dependence on Russian energy and lack of foresight. They argue that policies from the ÖVP and FPÖ have contributed to gender inequality by making full-time work difficult for women, calling for expanded childcare access to increase workforce participation. The party maintains that its own energy subsidies were successful, modernizing heating systems and reducing emissions, while criticizing the current government for failing to implement rent control and for prioritizing car industry subsidies over climate goals. The Greens claim the government’s budgetary plan is both underfunded and misdirected and propose reforming regional energy providers, using their profits to finance grid renewal and domestic energy generation.

On asylum, the Greens advocate a humane and legally grounded policy coordinated at the European level, coupled with strong external borders. Integration, particularly through German-language education, is described as key to social stability. The party opposes the suspension of family reunification, viewing it as unjustified, and stresses that deportation decisions should remain in the hands of the courts. The EU’s Migration Pact is regarded as an important step toward a more coordinated European asylum framework.

In foreign policy, the Greens’ position on the Israel–Palestine conflict balances condemnation of Hamas’s 7 October attack with criticism of the Israeli government’s handling of the humanitarian situation in Gaza. They call for suspending the EU’s association agreement with Israel and reaffirm Israel’s right to self-defence within international law. More broadly, the party emphasizes that neutrality remains a cornerstone of Austrian identity, but that it must not lead to moral blindness toward aggression. The leader described the Greens’ pacifist heritage as shaped by the Peace Movement yet argued that current realities demand an updated approach — one that includes credible self-defence capabilities.

FPÖ

Situation

The FPÖ entered the election from opposition and emerged as the single largest party, winning the most votes. However, coalition talks with the ÖVP collapsed, leaving the FPÖ outside of government. Despite this, it currently leads national polling by a significant margin.

Political Profile and policies

The FPÖ is a populist, illiberal and anti-EU party defined primarily by its opposition to what it describes as the “liberal consensus” on migration, climate policy, relations with Russia, and LGBTQ rights. In his Sommergespräch, the party’s leader cast himself as a political outsider seeking to “fundamentally change the system,” accusing other parties of thinking in black-and-white terms on issues like Ukraine and climate change. He maintained that the FPÖ was open to compromise with the ÖVP, but not, as he put it, “at the cost of destroying the country.”

Economically, the FPÖ’s platform centers on short-term relief and long-term restructuring. The party calls for immediate “first aid” measures to support struggling households, including energy price caps and reduced food taxes, while ending what it describes as the “criminalisation of CO₂.” In the longer term, it envisions a reorganization of the Austrian economy and state. The FPÖ insists that if the country can afford spending on Ukraine, asylum programs, and development aid, it can also afford domestic relief measures.

The party advocates a return to Russian gas imports for cost reasons and supports limited expansion of renewable energy while blaming high prices on the costs of grid reform. It argues that regions under FPÖ control already provide cheaper energy through local price caps. Broader economic policy focuses on cutting government expenditure to pre-COVID levels, consolidating healthcare administration under a single tier of government (to be decided by referendum), and reducing income adjustments for senior officials. The FPÖ rejects additional burdens on pensioners or small businesses, calling instead for higher taxation of banks.

On foreign policy, the FPÖ portrays itself as skeptical of both Brussels and Washington. The leader praised former U.S. President Donald Trump’s policies on issues such as Islam and foreign intervention while acknowledging that his tariffs have harmed European interests. He criticized the EU for what he sees as repeated negotiation failures and stated his intention to build new alliances within the European Parliament. The FPÖ seeks cooperation with the European People’s Party but accuses it of preferring coalitions with “leftists.”

Complementary Material

If you want to read more of my commentary on Austrian politics, like and restack this post. You can also go and check out:

• FPÖ Messaging Analysis: An older post that has been up on my website for some time. It analyses the FPÖ’s messaging and provides commentary on why I think that it is harmful.

• Analyse der Sommergespräche 2025: Short, opinionated commentary on the Sommergesräche in German.

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This is meant to serve as an orientation piece to better understand Czech national politics in the lead-up to the parliamentary elections this week. I’ll start by briefly introducing the current situation and, in the process, explain the relevant parties and their positions.

Current situation

Right now, there are seven parties in parliament, although three of them function in a pre-election coalition, so we’ll simplify it to five. Two are in the governing coalition and three are in the opposition. Current polling indicates that six parties (simplified from complex coalitions) will make it in this time. Let’s categorize them into the government, opposition, and newcomers.

Government

The government is made up of the SPOLU coalition and STAN (Mayors and Independents).

SPOLU

SPOLU is a coalition that emerged before the last parliamentary elections, bringing together ODS (Civic Democratic Party), TOP 09, and KDU-ČSL (Christian Democrats), with the goal of defeating the incumbent government—which they narrowly managed to achieve. They won the most votes, with most preferential votes going to ODS, which currently holds the prime ministership. The coalition occupies most cabinet positions but is trailing behind ANO in polling.

Ideologically, the coalition can broadly be characterized as center-right, with internal differences among the parties. In terms of positions, it can be seen as:

• Mixed on social policy: supports a parallel system for gay couples but not full marriage equality

• Pro-Western, though skeptical of some EU legislation

• Supports meeting NATO’s new defense spending target

• Pro-Ukrainian, initiating a munitions plan to use Western funds to buy ammunition from formerly neutral countries for Ukraine

• Focused on modernization of state institutions and streamlining

STAN

STAN is a standalone party that ran in coalition during the last election but completely overshadowed its partner in preferential voting, later breaking with them after scandals. They currently hold the position of interior minister along with other cabinet posts. According to recent polling, they rank fourth.

Their positions are very similar to SPOLU, and they plan to cooperate with them again after the election:

• Pro-European integration, supports adopting the Euro

• Supports strengthening NATO and maintaining aid to Ukraine

• Seeks to improve regional administration and invest in economically weaker regions

Opposition

ANO

ANO went into the last election as the incumbent governing party, having ruled for two terms, but narrowly lost first place to SPOLU, which then formed the governing coalition. As the main opposition for the past four years, they are now projected to win the most votes, dominating every other party in polling.

Their positions are not always consistent, but broadly include:

• Rejecting many EU policies, including the Green Deal and the Migration Pact

• Opposing NATO’s new defense spending target

• Proposing to nationalize the public broadcaster and halt anti-disinformation programs

• Ending the munitions initiative for Ukraine

• Nationalizing the power utility ČEZ

• Lowering energy prices

SPD

SPD has always been in the opposition. For these elections, they formed an informal alliance with three other parties. They are currently polling as the third-largest party.

Their positions include:

• Holding referenda on leaving the EU and NATO

• Opposition to:

  • the Green Deal

  • the Migration Pact

  • increased military spending

  • aid to Ukraine

Piráti

The Pirate Party entered the last election in coalition with STAN but was devastated in preferential voting. While they held some powerful positions, such as the foreign ministry, they failed to deliver on most of their promises and eventually left the government after a scandal involving their leader.

Their positions include:

• Adopting the Euro and deeper Western integration

• Combating corruption

• Expanding affordable housing

Newcomers

Motoristé Sobě

They first ran in the 2024 EU elections, achieving unprecedented success. They are now attempting to translate that momentum into the parliamentary elections, though with mixed results—recent polling places them at 7.6%.

Their positions include:

• Rejection of the Green Deal and Migration Pact

• Support for Czech industry

• Defunding NGOs and deregulating the economy

• Shrinking the state

Stačilo!

Stačilo! is a coalition made up largely of the former Communist Party (which failed in the last election), other small left-wing parties, and the Social Democratic Party (which also failed previously). Even without the Social Democrats, they performed surprisingly well in the EU elections.

Their positions include:

• Leaving the EU and NATO

• Ending support for Ukraine

• Advocating communism through a so-called “regime change”

Sources

• Current polling

• Overview of the parties / Archive

• All programs in one place in Czech/Archive

The Complexity Problem

Liberal democracy works because it incentivizes governments to fix the problems bothering the population, ensuring relative social cohesion. For this to work, two things must be true:

• The public can accurately perceive the issues.

• The public can accurately see progress being made in fixing them.

My thesis is that liberal governance in the West has already solved most of the “easy” problems. People aren’t starving in the streets, violent crime isn’t rampant, and basic rights are widely secured. What remains are problems that are increasingly technical and difficult to evaluate.

Want to bring down the cost of living? That requires grappling with macroeconomics and carefully designed policies to reduce inflation. Want to address climate change? That demands comparing technologies, assessing trade-offs, and building infrastructure on a generational scale.

The public often doesn’t realize when progress has been made and cannot appreciate proposals without wading through complex research. As a result, actually fixing problems brings fewer rewards than making aggressive gestures about them. Politicians gain more by offering symbolic solutions, blaming opponents, and harvesting short-term electoral benefits than by pursuing long-term structural fixes.

Where I Diverge

Here’s where I part ways with illiberals: I have historical literacy. Across history, many people have thought in similar terms and acted on them—often with catastrophic results. The Weimar Republic and Tsarist Russia both attempted to radically restructure in response to real injustices. Both collapsed into authoritarian nightmares, producing millions of deaths and irreparable harm.

So while I understand the need for change, I also recognize the risks of pursuing it recklessly. That is why I continue to advocate for our current institutional framework, while pushing for pragmatic reforms that strengthen it.

The Illiberal Playbook

Illiberals, however, actively seek to undermine democracy. Their strategy looks like this:

1. Build a mass following by appealing to people who feel lost and crave community.

2. Cement distrust in the system.

3. Erode government capacity by paralyzing decision-making.

4. Use that paralysis to deepen public disillusionment.

5. Push the system into such crisis that its legitimacy collapses.

6. Seize power once people beg for “alternatives.”

This cycle is extraordinarily dangerous. If it succeeds, people will look back at today’s “ineffective” institutions with nostalgia.

My Advice

The best path forward is to support parties that commit to democratic norms while pursuing serious institutional reform. But I am not naïve: I expect many European countries will slide into ungovernability or illiberalism within the next 10–15 years. My hope is simply that we preserve as much as possible—and create the conditions for a democratic comeback.

If you’re interested in concrete steps in that direction, subscribe to not miss out on future posts where I’ll cover them:

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Credit for the thumbnail: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tower_of_Babel

Migration

Modern societies produce chronic labor shortages due to several factors:

• Women’s emancipation and two-paycheck households create more necessity and possibility for someone external to do household chores and care work.

• People in developed societies generally don’t want to do jobs that don’t pay well and include a lot of manual labor.

People in societies that are mid-developed have both the aspirations and capabilities to take these jobs. Thus, immigration is a naturally occurring phenomenon and we have to deal with it somehow.

By allowing them in legally and setting up a quick pathway to (dual) citizenship, we can benefit from their labor and grow our economies while helping their origin countries through remittances. This also prevents them from settling permanently in destination countries because there is no necessity to, as they can travel back and forth.

• Border restrictions increase the number of immigrants in destination countries because:

  • Migrants don’t leave out of fear of not being able to return.

  • Migrants bring over their families.

  • Those with vague aspirations to emigrate now all act on them out of fear of missing out.

  • Migrants still find new routes to enter illegally.

Government Investment

Effective government investment into projects can increase productivity in two ways. First, it creates jobs, providing employees with money they can then spend, which stimulates demand. Second, the infrastructure it creates can create more favorable conditions for people to work in the future, increasing productivity. The two biggest sectors for investment, in my estimation, are green energy and traffic infrastructure.

Green Energy

Apart from the fact that we risk huge harm to our species if we don’t combat climate change, it is obvious that we can’t rely on coal and gas forever. By developing our green energy infrastructure, we can solve both of these issues as well as make electricity cheaper. Therefore, there should be huge subsidies for solar power and further development of wind turbines and hydroelectric power generators.

Foreign Policy

For an effective foreign policy, we should rely on credible deterrence, on which effective diplomacy can be built.

Credible Deterrence

Credible deterrence means that you are capable (both in the technical and actual sense) of inflicting serious harm on your competitors if they go against your interests. This means you need to have a strong apparatus of power projection, including competent armed forces and other tools.

You also need to have the political willpower to implement the repercussions for misbehavior, and your counterpart must believe that you will implement them.

These are all policies that can be implemented well in our current political system. The next part will go over huge structural changes.

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<a href="https://www.freepik.com/free-vector/banner-policies-rules-agreement_9668893.htm">Image by upklyak on Freepik</a>

First of all, simply assuming that migration has net positive outcomes is incredibly simplistic and ignores the many nuances and interlocking factors at play. Numerous studies have examined this issue with varying conclusions, but one consistent finding is that the net economic effects are marginal when viewed in the context of the economies of both destination and origin countries.

This doesn't mean migration has no impact—it does—but those effects tend to be hyper-local and often cancel each other out. From that, it follows that migration policy should primarily be handled at the local level (within destination countries).

Another flaw in my earlier thinking was the mistaken belief that most migrants are refugees—which is, frankly, laughably wrong.

I was also far too pessimistic about the success of integration in Western countries. In reality, migrants tend to integrate quite well when given job opportunities or pathways to citizenship. Contrary to my assumptions, Western countries manage integration reasonably well on average—considering crime rates and language acquisition.

That said, I still think my original instinct to support migration was correct—just not for the reasons I initially believed. As the author explains, a country’s stance on migration must align with its broader economic model. If a country wants a typical "Western-style" economy—centered on growth, free markets, and international trade—it must support immigration, since such systems routinely generate chronic labor shortages. Conversely, an autarkic model with slow growth and heavy subsidies for local industries would logically align with lower levels of immigration.

As it happens, I find myself in the first camp (for now), since it seems better at producing decent living standards—at least in my view, which I admit is still not fully informed. That’s probably the next rabbit hole I need to dive into.

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I like to call it the Omni-Cause: the tendency to see every problem as being caused by the ideological enemy. Once this mode of thinking takes over, your ability to assess facts critically is gone. Every event gets interpreted through this single lens. The Omni-Cause makes it possible for you to explain everything within your worldview.

I first encountered this concept through an Obsidian note by Destiny. He describes it like this:

It becomes incredibly difficult to break anyone out of any given constellation because there is always some underlying transcendental entity that can explain every single part of why the constellation is true. Even evidence that seems to be in opposition to any particular belief is reinterpreted through the transcendental entity and becomes evidence for the particular belief, so there is absolutely no way to disconfirm the constellation as a whole.

This is the epistemic equivalent of a black hole. Once you accept a singular cause as the explanation for everything, you're just trying to shoe-horn your highest evil into every problem.

What’s fascinating is how this problem is seen across the spectrum. Ben Shapiro, though often blind to his own side’s excesses, provides a surprisingly sharp take) when he accuses the far left of collapsing all causes—climate change, trans rights, anti-Zionism—into a generalized hatred of capitalism and the West. He calls this the Omni-Cause:

The answer lies in something called the Omni-Cause. For the modern left, all their various causes—whether it's trans rights, environmentalism, or support for groups like Hamas—are fused into one big, ideological blob. The specifics of the cause don’t really matter. What unites them is a shared hatred of "the system"—which really just means capitalism and the West.

He’s not wrong in diagnosing this behavior on the left (although he does leave out the fact that this worldview is most prevalent in extreme circles)—but what he fails to see is how the right mirrors the exact same logic with its obsession over the Deep State, globalism, or cultural Marxism.

This kind of thinking isn’t unique to “stupid people” or one political side. It’s deeply human. We want the world to make sense. But the world doesn't work like that. The impulse to unify everything into one cause makes discourse shallow, as both sides can see the same problem and not agree on a solution because of the added junk the Omni-Cause adds.

So how do you resist this?

In Yourself:

• Be wary of ideologies that claim to have one answer for everything. The world is too complex for that.

• Be suspicious when your biggest political concern seems to explain every other issue too.

• Defer to domain experts. You don’t need to interpret the world alone.

In Others:

• Don’t argue facts—start with intuitions. Ask questions like:

  “Do you really think one factor explains all of this?”

  “What would you need to see to change your mind?”

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I'll start with this thesis: I feel a responsibility to give something back to society. This comes from recognizing that I live in an extremely privileged position—one where I have the time, energy, and technical ability to consume large amounts of content created by people far more intelligent than me. Because of that, I see it as my obligation to extract what I find valuable and present it in a digestible format.

But here’s where I run into a major question: Since I inevitably add my own "spice" to many of the ideas I cover, is it ethically acceptable for me to inject my reasoning into the more refined thought processes of others?

To be honest, I still don't have a definitive answer. There are strong arguments on both sides. I'll lay them out briefly:

Reasons I shouldn’t:

• By adding my own interpretations, I might rob people of the chance to discover the material independently and form their own conclusions.

• The perspectives I choose to cover are limited by my own filters—what I perceive as unpersuasive gets left out. That narrows the insight available to readers.

• If I don't represent all sides fairly, neutral or opposing readers are less likely to be moved by what I write.

Reasons I should:

• I simply don’t have the time to fully explore all sides of every discussion.

• It would be irresponsible to present every perspective neutrally without evaluating how they hold up under scrutiny.

• Hiding behind a shield of “objectivity” when my content is critiqued for its weaknesses is cowardly. People should be able to engage with my actual take.

• I genuinely enjoy evaluating and dissecting thought structures, and I do believe I add value by doing that.

• By offering an opinion, I give others something to disagree with—which can help them sharpen their own thinking.

• I want people to adopt my views—obviously, I think they’re correct.

• People probably read my work because they find my perspective valuable. So I should provide it.

So where does that leave me?

Somewhere in a weird limbo. Sometimes I’m “open to all perspectives,” and other times I go full “my opinion is the truth and anyone who disagrees is stupid.” I like to tell myself that I base this on how well I understand a topic, and that I clearly mark what’s my opinion. But in reality, it’s a bit unsatisfying because it is very vague. When do I feel like something has my opinion spiced into it and when do I feel like I understand an issue enough to confidently state my opinion?. I always have the option to just not follow that rule whenever It doesn’t suit me because I lack a clear guiding principle.

That’s why I’m sharing this: I’d love to hear your thoughts, and I want you to push back when you think I’m doing something wrong in general.

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Authoritarian regimes are on the rise, while established democracies are sliding into illiberalism and, eventually, autocracy—Hungary, Turkey, and Slovakia being prime examples (here’s a great discussion on this). As someone who strongly supports liberal democracy, I want to explore why this is happening.

The Progressive Angle

We’ll start with the progressive view. Adam Something breaks it down like this:

• After WWII, a social contract emerged: If you work full time, you should be able to afford a middle-class life.

• This contract was broken in the 1980s with the dismantling of the welfare state.

• Billionaires divided the economy among themselves.

• This helped trigger the 2008 financial crisis.

• As a result, trust in institutions eroded, and many turned to far-right authoritarian figures.

His conclusion is that re-establishing a strong social contract through leftist economic policy would undermine the far right’s appeal and restore faith in democracy.

Part of his optimism stems from recent gains by socialist and left-wing movements in countries like France and Germany.

The Conservative Angle

I’m reconstructing this from watching clips of Ben Shapiro and James Lindsay’s conversation with Jordan Peterson:

• The political landscape used to be balanced between conservatives and progressives.

• After Barack Obama’s election, more radical leftist voices—shaped by postmodern and neo-Marxist ideas—gained cultural influence.

• Their rhetoric, particularly around identity, alienated young white men.

• In response, these men gravitated toward opposing voices—some of which were also extreme, but in the opposite direction.

• The cultural “guardrails” became too restrictive, sparking a backlash that didn’t stop at balance but blew past it entirely.

The problem with this approach is that many conservatives refuse to recognize that figures like Donald Trump embody illiberalism. Without that recognition, they’re fundamentally unable to propose meaningful solutions—at least as far as I can tell.

My Take

As usual, both sides have important insights. It’s crucial to recognize the economic roots of institutional distrust, but cultural dynamics matter too.

I reject the simplistic claim that “wokeness” is to blame. What really failed was the narrative—prominent after the Cold War and championed by Reagan and Thatcher—that free markets would automatically lead to democracy. In reality, democracy requires robust institutions within which markets can operate. That misguided optimism contributed to the weakening of the welfare state and, indirectly, today’s economic frustration.

But I also take issue with parts of the progressive framing. People don’t operate primarily based on material conditions. The decline in living standards wasn’t important because it made life physically unbearable—it was important because it broke the narrative. Or, to borrow from Timothy Snyder, it collapsed the "politics of inevitability." When that narrative failed, people lost a shared sense of direction and drifted into confusion.

That confusion—not just hardship—is what made them susceptible to extremists on both the left and the right, including the very parties Adam mentions. These movements don’t offer better solutions; they offer destruction of the status quo. And while economic decline may have catalyzed this shift, explaining it purely through hardship is overly reductionist.

Then there’s the internet. It didn’t just replace local conversations—it rewired how people understand the world. Instead of negotiating meaning through shared discourse, people now consume narratives that conform with their biases with no serious opposition. They’re rarely challenged, and often don't even realize how isolated their views have become. I think the conservative angle comes into play here—both sides radicalize in their echo chambers, with progressives arguably affected worse.

So what can you do—especially if you’re not a policymaker?

Talk to people around you. Not in the way that media is doing by talking to radical freaks who are media trained and have no interest in approaching truth. Have good-faith conversations. Use the debating tools I’ve shared on this Substack. Your goal shouldn’t be to “win” debates but to make others genuinely think. Be the pragmatic progressive, the principled centrist, or the conservative who still believes in institutions. Break down assumptions. Challenge narratives. That's how liberal democracy is rebuilt—from the ground up.

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First, some context on my own position. I’m positively inclined toward religion—mainly because of Jordan Peterson. I explain this more fully in this post, but the core idea is simple: I believe we should base our moral principles on religious stories because they help us live more prosperous and meaningful lives. Peterson led me to this view through his Bible lectures, which ground religious ideas in practical insights. He reframed religion for me—not as “do what Jesus said so you’ll get into heaven,” but as “do what Jesus said because it reflects what humanity has learned about living well.” That shift completely changed my outlook. I wasn’t just an atheist before—I was indifferent to religion altogether. I didn’t get the point.

This new position, however, puts me at odds with many people I deeply respect intellectually. Plenty of smart thinkers hold the opposite view, and I had hoped Peterson would defend our shared stance in this debate. Instead, I was thoroughly disappointed.

Peterson absolutely refused to stake out a clear position. He retreated into semantic fog, dodging big questions and becoming condescending whenever challenged. Whether it’s by choice or because he’s unable, he didn’t conduct himself well. As someone who has studied debate theory, I’m particularly frustrated by his rejection of the idea that debate involves “arguing to win.” Yes, dialogue should aim at understanding—but real understanding sometimes requires a firm tone, especially when the other side is being evasive. That doesn’t mean everyone just avoids pressing you because you’re uncomfortable.

A major consequence of this is that many people now walk away with a completely wrong impression of what Peterson actually believes. And that’s not their fault. Peterson blurs the line between being a “Christian” in the traditional sense—going to church, believing the Bible’s truth claims—and being “Christian-adjacent,” which I’d argue describes both him and myself. This ambiguity makes it impossible to engage seriously with what he’s saying, which I suspect is intentional.

And that’s a shame, because the underlying idea is extremely compelling—if it's presented clearly. Watching atheists react to the debate was painful. Many came close to seriously engaging with the idea, only to give up in frustration because Peterson was such a lousy debater.

In short: the edges of my position have been slightly eroded. Atheists should still watch Peterson’s Bible lectures. But Peterson needs to grow a spine and actually defend the position he holds.

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This thought started festering after I watched Lex Fridman’s interview with Zelensky. In the outro, Lex mentioned that he’d read 10 books on Ukraine (including one I’ve read), skimmed 20 more, listened to hours of supplementary material, and took notes. To someone who hasn’t seen the interview, that might sound impressive. But if you have seen it, you know he asked questions like, “What do you admire about Elon Musk?” and “Do you think you can find it in your heart to forgive Putin?” (paraphrased).

When I heard that outro, I was stunned. If he really did all that prep, what was the point? You don’t need 30 books and hours of podcasts to ask questions that sound like they came off a LinkedIn post. And if he did do all that prep with a purpose—how the hell did it result in that line of questioning?

Then he casually adds that when he reads history, he focuses on “high-level ideas.” That just baffles me. That’s not learning history. That’s mining books for vaguely inspiring content. It’s shallow. It’s aesthetic. It’s not engagement.

That confusion simmered until it boiled over in a completely different situation. During a presentation on communism, one attendee said, “You’re wrong—I’ve read Das Kapital.” When the discussion ended, he gave a summary of communist thought that I could’ve heard from any surface-level YouTuber. And honestly, I could’ve pushed back harder against the presenter’s final take that “communist countries failed,” even with some basic counterpoints.

But what stuck with me wasn’t the argument. It was the claim. I seriously doubt he’s read the book. And I’m not just being pedantic—I have a working model in my head of what reading serious nonfiction does to a person.

Here’s what I mean:

• People who read difficult books—really read them—change. They gain insights that itch to be applied. They talk differently. They think differently.

• Das Kapital isn’t a book you casually consume. Volume I alone is nearly 1,000 pages of dense economic theory and philosophical critique. The whole thing is three volumes. No one reads it “for fun” and then just… never references it again.

• If you’ve actually read it, you should either be showing off or using it somewhere. The idea that someone could read it and then never bring it up—not in teaching, not in writing, not in public discourse—makes no sense to me.

Just to show how absurd these claims feel to me in contrast:

• I’m currently reading The Gates of Europe, a ~400-page book on Ukrainian history. I’m not just reading it and moving on. I’m making detailed chapter-by-chapter notes in Obsidian, summarizing each one with 1,000–2,000 words.

• I read each chapter twice—once fully, then again with a highlighter—and now I’m going through it a third time for my summaries. And this is a book that’s way more readable than Das Kapital.

• Even so, it’s already shaped how I see the world. It’s not just information—it’s transformation.

What should you take from this: Don’t trust people because they said they read a book, judge them by how they treat the issue.

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The problem shows up when you start talking to them about politics (or if that sounds too loaded, call it current events). They're completely clueless. That becomes a real issue when some of them hold strong opinions, argue with confidence, or even try to “educate” others based on stuff they saw online.

That’s catastrophic. Sure, you can learn things from video essays or podcasts, but it’s not the same. I realized this the hard way—after watching a pretty in-depth YouTube series on Ukrainian history, I picked up a book thinking I’d already know a lot. I was dead wrong. My understanding wasn’t just incomplete, it was off-base altogether.

Seriously, reading real material on topics you care about isn’t just helpful—it’s engaging, and it pays off. You start connecting ideas, seeing patterns, becoming someone who can actually contribute meaningfully in conversations. And it’s not even that hard. Two non-fiction books and four good news articles a week already puts you far ahead of most people.

Here’s what I’ve done, just to give you a practical example. I’m into geopolitics, so I picked up two books by Tim Marshall—Prisoners of Geography and The Power of Geography. They’re super readable but packed with insight. I read them three years ago, and I still find myself using the stuff I learned. On top of that, I check a few solid news sources twice a week and read an article or two that stands out. I also went deep on the Russo-Ukrainian War and threw myself into serious research on it. You can do the same if something clicks for you.

I’ll release a follow-up on Thursday about some flaws I discovered with this method, but until then, try putting some of this into action.

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To understand where I’m coming from, it helps to know a bit about me. I spent a lot of time in text-based internet debate forums, where clarity and argument structure were everything. I also went through some light journalism coaching, where brevity was drilled into my skull. Put simply: I care deeply about how arguments are made and how ideas are communicated.

That’s why it frustrates me when people prioritize style over substance while trying to make a point. There’s no need for paragraph after paragraph of filler rhetorical tricks just to show off your command of English. Nobody’s reading your piece to marvel at your comma placement or count how many hyperbolic questions you can fit into one breath. They want your argument. They want the core idea.

The fact that someone is even reading your work is already a sign of respect and curiosity. Rewarding that with arrogance—or worse, wasting their time—is ungrateful. You’re not being clever. You’re being obnoxious.

Give your reader context. Frame the issue. Offer a genuine insight. Maybe even start with a small acknowledgement to ground the piece. Then, walk them through your thought process like you would with a friend. Wrap it up with a clear conclusion that makes your stance clear.

Good writing isn't about sounding smart; it's about delivering value to the audience.

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That said, my current position is this: societies need religion to function well. The core of my reasoning is that I don’t believe human morality can sustain itself without a transcendental authority behind it. Without such an entity, we lack the internal corrective mechanisms that keep selfishness in check.

You might argue that moral order can be upheld through other means—belief in human rights, or a well-designed legal system. I have two main objections to this:

1. These systems are ultimately grounded in religious assumptions. Human rights, for instance, are built on the idea that every individual has inherent moral worth—an idea rooted in the religious belief that humans are created in the image of God.

2. If you strip away religion, these systems become vulnerable. Religion isn’t just a moral framework—it’s a deeply refined narrative structure that has evolved over centuries of grappling with these exact questions.

And I need to emphasize that last point about narrative, because it’s absolutely foundational. Human cognition is narrative-driven. We don’t navigate the world as pure rational agents analyzing objects; we experience it as a landscape filled with tools, threats, allies, and meaning. Religion gives shape to that landscape in a way nothing else has yet replicated.

That said, there are dangers in this approach. We must be careful not to drift into fundamentalism. Texts like the Bible and the Torah undoubtedly contain profound moral insights—but they’re also ancient, complex, and layered. To build a society on a strict, literal interpretation of them is not only reductive, it's risky. When someone claims to have the definitive reading of these texts and insists we reorder society around their interpretation, that person is likely more dangerous than wise.

My core point is this: we shouldn’t dismiss the moral wisdom embedded in religious tradition—wisdom shaped and sharpened through centuries of human experience—just because we no longer believe every word literally. At the same time, we also shouldn't treat those stories as inflexible blueprints. It's my belief—or perhaps my hope—that if we lived as though God existed (which, to be clear, I’m still uncertain about), we’d all be better off.

But as I said from the outset, I don’t pretend to have this all figured out. These are just my current thoughts, and I’d genuinely welcome someone pushing back on them.

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Why do I get up?

Why do I drag myself out of bed
when everything I achieve
will eventually turn to dust anyway?

We live on a planet
that already seems tiny compared to the solar system.
And the solar system?
In the context of the galaxy—
barely more than a speck of dust.
So now I’m supposed to believe
that doing math changes something?

Will anyone remember me?
My life?
My achievements?
Once our planet has long crumbled into atoms?

These are the questions that cross my mind
on Monday mornings
or in the early hours of the day,
when life feels more like a punishment than a gift.
When I’m in a bad place,
and nothing seems to make sense.
When even simple things
suddenly feel like insurmountable obstacles.

Why do I get up?

What I’m saying makes sense.
Objectively speaking, my actions mean nothing.
Absolutely nothing.
But do you notice something?
Even that statement feels wrong.
And that’s interesting.
The so-called "objective perspective" isn’t really objective at all—
because the feeling it gives you
is already a value judgment.
Our entire perception, everything we do,
goes against that statement.

We often think we’re being rational:
We see something, think about it, draw conclusions.
But that’s not true.
Not really.
Our perception is like a filter—
a filter shaped over thousands of years by evolution.
And through this filter, we evaluate:
Does this help me? Does it harm me?

Seen like that,
it’s actually absurd to say everything is meaningless.
You look out the window, feel something—
danger, opportunity, pain—
and decide what path to take.
And if you choose the wrong one,
if you stand still, it hurts.
Because the world doesn’t go easy on you.
It pushes.
It grinds.
It puts pressure on you.
Not imagined,
not exaggerated—
but real, tangible, unmistakable.

And that pressure is real.
Pain is real.
When you hit your shin, you don’t think:
“Oh no, this is damaging the structural integrity of my body.”
Or:
“Well, this doesn’t matter, because Earth is tiny compared to the solar system.”
You think: “Ouch. Stop.”

And that exact “Ouch, stop” is baked into everything.
Relationship stress? School? Fear of the future?
They’re all just complex abstractions of “Ouch.”
And that’s why it makes sense to do something about it.
That’s why your actions matter—
when you try to make the “Ouch” smaller.
For yourself.
For others.

And that’s what gives your actions meaning.
Not in a cosmic sense.
Not for some distant galaxy.
But for you.
For the people around you.

And the best way to do that?
Be part of society.
Take part.
Because civilization, at its core, is a long-term experiment
to find out how we can live together
without constantly hurting each other.

Simply participating in that experiment
increases the chances that your life will be less painful.
Hospitals, police, social programs, and the legal system—
these are all the products of centuries of trial and error.
Structures that, on average, make life more bearable for all of us.

That’s why I get up.
Because I believe I can reduce the “Ouch”
by participating.

There are multiple ways to be illiberal, I’ve picked three of the most widespread forms, explained why they all suck, and then broken each one down in more detail.

Common Problems

The most common ways of being illiberal today are by being a communist, a libertarian, or a fascist. Yeah, they seem diametrically opposed—but they share some crucial traits. First off, to seriously buy into any of them, you need to be spectacularly arrogant. You have to believe that your worldview is so airtight that every other ideology is either idiotic or actively malicious. That kind of certainty exists elsewhere too, but illiberal ideologies seem to require it. It’s baked into the mindset: I’m right, everyone else is deluded.

I know that feeling—I used to be in that phase. I’ve also listened to enough of these lunatics talk to spot the pattern. That’s why I’m not interested in giving them the benefit of the doubt. They sure as hell wouldn’t give it to me.

Beyond the arrogance, what really unites these ideologies is the belief that the current system is fundamentally broken and needs a complete overhaul. What they seem to miss are its benefits—and how their solutions stack up against it.

Libertarians

I’ll start with libertarians because I used to be one for 2–3 years. The core belief here is that society improves as individual freedom increases, and that any attempt to restrict that freedom is just the establishment trying to keep you down. It’s a worldview that puts “freedom” on a pedestal, as the one true virtue everything else should serve.

What it misses completely is the concept of collective freedom. Your freedom doesn’t exist in a vacuum. For you to be free in a meaningful way, someone else might have to give something up. That’s where rules and institutions come in—to make sure one person’s “freedom” doesn’t turn into another person’s burden.

Without that balance, what you get isn’t freedom—it’s power. And power ends up replacing structure. That’s not a recipe for stability. It’s a free-for-all dressed up as idealism.

Communists

The biggest flaw communists make is confusing noble goals with infallible methods. They assume that if you disagree with how they plan to get to a goal, you must oppose the goal itself.

Say they want to eliminate poverty by abolishing private property. If I say that’s not going to work, I’m not suddenly cheering for poor people to starve. But they often act like I am. That mindset is toxic.

Worse, it’s arrogant in a very specific way: it assumes not only that you’ve identified all the problems of the world, but also that you’ve found the perfect solution. That’s delusional. Reality is messy. Facts are infinite. So are interpretations of those facts. Not all interpretations are equal, obviously—some lead to better outcomes than others—but communism’s track record is straight-up bad.

Major communist projects either collapsed under their own weight—see the Soviet Union’s stagnation and succession disasters—or survived by becoming capitalist in practice, like China. If your ideology either fails or mutates into the thing it hates most, how can you still claim you’ve got everything figured out?

Fascists

Fascists are in the same boat. Every real-world attempt has ended in human misery, instability, and war. And yet, somehow, there are still people who think the solution to social division is to hand full control to one all-powerful leader who decides who counts as “us” and who’s an enemy.

This doesn’t solve the problem of balancing interests. It replaces balance with force and labels dissent as treason. That doesn’t unify society—it atomizes it. It didn’t work then, and there’s no reason to believe it would now.

This is just one part of an upcoming liberal manifesto where I lay out what I believe in and why. But I think it’s strong enough to stand on its own.

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